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This article identifies important economic differences between the three main
models of Welfare State, (“Anglo-Saxon”, “Nordic”, “Continental”, the latter
with a characteristically “Latin” variation). They differ with respect to the main
source of financing for care (private purchase, income taxation, pay-roll
taxation), the main place where care takes place (private services, public
services, the family), and the amount and the channels of resources directed to
the needy (cash transfers or transfers in kind by the State, private intra-family
transfers).
This paper shows how “Liberal” and “Nordic” models, albeit very
different in design and in final outcomes with respect to income distribution, are
similar because they foster more “symmetric” gender relations. Men and women
are similarly situated with respect to production and redistribution of resources.
The Continental and Latin models are “asymmetric”, because they direct people
of different sexes towards specialisation in different types of work, unpaid care
work if they are women, paid non-care work if they are men. Thus they create
and reinforce dependency of women on male family members for monetary
resources, reduce free time available to women, and produce care of very high
quality but of very uneven distribution.
Quality of care in asymmetric Welfare regimes may be quite high because
the traditional pattern is capable of providing “person-specific” services:
services whose quality depends on the specific individuality and personal
relations of the caregiver and the cared for. I argue that there is no necessary
economic trade-off between symmetry and person-specificity, if the issues are
clear and correctly framed.GENDER SYMMETRY IN THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN WELFARE
STATES
1. Symmetric and asymmetric Welfare regimes
The set of practices and institution that we call the Welfare State plays a key
role in reallocating money and time between people of different age, wealth,
sex, thus allowing them to achieve a given standard of living. It does this either
by providing cash transfers, or by providing public services, thus affecting the
proportion of paid care work versus unpaid. By such redistribution the Welfare
State has contributed to reshaping women's role, to changing the traditional
division of labour within and outside the family, and has affected gender relations
between men and women in a variety of ways. The social notions of gender have
changed as a result of these processes 
1. We may therefore discuss not just a
“Welfare State”, but a “Welfare regime”, i.e. the configuration of practices
producing care, including care produced in the home and by the market.
Redistribution between the rich and the poor is a classical topic of the
debate on the Welfare State: its original purpose is to create a safety net,
insuring against the risk of becoming poor due to illness, accident, or old age.
Redistribution between generations, young versus old people, is a more recent
and less fully debated topic, which emerged among economists when some
financial pitfalls of existing pension schemes were subject to analysis by means
of overlapping generations models based on identical “representative agents”
2.
In this paper I will leave aside these two topics. I will focus instead on
redistribution of time and money between people of different sexes, a topic that
has not been fully explored yet. In order to understand it, we need an analytical
framework that explicitly takes account of the economic value of the services
produced within the household, mostly by women. Transfers of resources by the
Welfare State may be in cash or in the form of services. Cash may be used to
purchase care, and public services may substitute for domestically produced
ones. In both cases, care givers will be hired to provide care, and paid work will
substitute unpaid work. Thus, the size and the form of the public transfers
determine gender relations. They produce a particular configuration in the
distribution of work, between paid and unpaid, between public employment and
private employment. How much care will be provided domestically, purchased
on the market, or provided by public services is the joint result of individual
choices and public policy choices. Public policy, and in particular social policy,
therefore, is one of the main factors determining the status, economic
independence, and relative power of men and women.3
Issues of redistribution between the sexes, and its effects on gender, may
be obscured in many ways (Orloff, 1996): first, there is a long tradition of
measuring poverty and of redistributing wealth using families, as opposed to
individuals, as the relevant reference unit. This implies the assumption that
within each family resource allocation would be by definition equitable, and not
an object of policy intervention. Resources accruing to individual members are
not even measured. This “patriarchal” assumption has been challenged in the
economic literature (Ferber and Nelson, 1993).
Second, often only money and goods are taken into account when
measuring welfare: time is not. An equal sharing of money and goods could still
mask an uneven distribution of welfare due to an uneven distribution of free
versus working time, and time spent in domestic work is not accounted as time
spent working
3.
Third, often Welfare provisions make reference to one particular model of
family taking it as typical, and by doing that assigns it normative value. Families
and gender relations that do not correspond to the norm are not supported, while
behaviour corresponding to the model is rewarded. Often, but not always, this
model is the traditional family, an heterosexual family where the parents are
married, the father is the exclusive breadwinner and the mother the exclusive
housekeeper. Gearing provisions to this particular model of the family, as it is
done in Italy, means that those who break with this model, and in particular,
women who want to be both workers in the market AND mothers and care
givers, are penalised (even though working women as such are not, and full time
housekeepers are not). Women who wish to enjoy a “double presence” in the
home and on the job, end up carrying a “double burden” instead (Plantenga,
1998).
In the last decade, a growing body of literature examined the most
important aspects of the relation between sex, gender and Welfare policies
4,
contributing to penetrate this obscurity. My discussion below draws on that
literature, summarising some of the finding in a general scheme in order to
provide tools for the evaluation of public policies from this point of view.
Redistribution by wealth and by sex are very different in each of the three
main models of Welfare State, i.e. “Anglo-Saxon”, “Nordic” and “Continental”,
identified in sociology and political science following the seminal work of
Esping - Andersen (1990 and 1996). These models differ with respect to the
main source of financing for care (private purchase, income taxation, pay-roll
taxation), the main place where care takes place (private services, public
services, the family) and the amount and the channels of resources directed to4
the needy (cash transfers or transfers in kind by the State, private intra family
transfers)
5.
Each model has to provide the basic functionings that constitute care, once
produced entirely within families: the final stages in the provision of food,
clothing, and clean shelter for all the members of the family, care for the
children, education, care for the sick, care for the frail elderly, resource transfers
in the event of lack of income. This care may be home produced, state produced,
or market produced
6, and substitution between the three modes of care provision
happens all the time. The chosen mix determines the condition of the care giver:
he or she may be a public employee, a private employee, or a relative with no
formal employment ties.
 Each model has a chosen way – preferred, but not unique – to provide for
care: each model operates under a “mix”. A model is only a basic scheme, but
each country uses all three ways of funding, all three channels of redistribution,
and all three places of care, each in different proportions. The liberal model is
centred upon the market, care may be purchased, thus funding is private and
care is provided in privately owned, but not domestic, premises. Transfers of
resources to the needy may be private (charities), and when public they are in
cash rather than in the form of services. The Nordic model is centred on the
State, uses income taxation to provide care, which is provided in public
premises, and transfers by the State are preferably in kind. The Continental
model is centred on the family, care is provided in the home, and may use public
or private sources of financing, because public transfers are in cash rather in
kind, so public funds become private funds. Each model developed with and
within a corresponding political culture, liberalism, social democracy, and
catholic social thinking (social-market economics) respectively.
Each model is a “regime”, i.e. a set of coherent practices, fitting together
in different ways to satisfy care needs. The concept of “Welfare regime” is
useful in that it underlines the fact that in each regime the parts fit together in a
coherent way. This has strong implications for the possibilities of reform. It
means that it is not always possible to copy “best practices”, to import single
welfare programs from other countries. When doing this, policy makers should
consider spill-over effects on the entire regime. Such spill-overs shift the burden
of adjustment to policy reforms from some subset of citizens on to some other.
When budget cuts decrease cash and services available to families, adjustment
also takes the form of substitution of market produced or state produced care
with home produced care.
 “Nordic” and “liberal” welfare regimes, albeit very different in size and
in other dimensions of equity, are similar in one thing: they are relatively more5
“symmetric”, while continental regimes are “asymmetric”. By “symmetric” I
mean that they treat men and women alike – differently in each regime, but alike
to each other. Continental regime are “asymmetric”, in that they try to induce
people of each biological sex towards different work: domestic, unpaid fork for
women, paid work in the labour market for men.
Some important pathologies of the Latin welfare States are due to this
asymmetry. On the other hand, this asymmetry has some positive by-products
that produce strong resistance towards its reform. Attempts to reform the
continental welfare regimes mimicking reforms enacted in symmetric welfare
regimes, may worsen the asymmetry of the Continental regimes, with
unwelcome results in terms of equity, in terms of efficiency, and in terms of
financial soundness.
To make clear what I mean by symmetric, I am going to resort to a
graphic presentation of the flows of economic resources, warning the reader to
keep in mind that graphs are models that necessarily simplify the complexity of
an argument. The first graph represents traditional social reproduction, after
industrialisation but before the introduction of Welfare provisions. We may
think of the rural household in pre-industrial times as a place where people of
both gender provided goods and services in kind to other family members, and
sold some of the family’s surplus products. Industrialisation and urbanisation
changed the work and care arrangements. Young people and men sold their
labour for a wage, women of reproductive age specialised in domestic
production of care, in exchange for an informal intrafamily transfer of resources,
what we label as “unpaid work”. This arrangement is the one portrayed in the
first graph.





This arrangement became so widespread in the industrial societies in the
last two centuries to shape the notion of what we now call “traditional”, even
though it reflects the arrangements that prevailed for a relative short period of
time in a relative small part of the world. It may even be that in its pure form it
may have never actually existed: young working class women always worked
for money, and men always provided some of the care. Yet, its archetypal form
lives in the minds of most people, and is a very powerful mental attractor even
to people who reject it as a normative model.
The graph was drawn still keeping as a focal point unpaid care work and
use of time of men and women. “Unpaid Care Work” is defined loosely as to
include all those activities needed to keep people fed, clean, attended physically
and psychologically accordingly to a commonly accepted standard. It is the
activity that is needed to transform goods into well being, production into
consumption.
In this arrangement, care is produced within the family, using as an input
women’s time and men’s money. Men’s time is used on the job market, to earn
money to purchase the goods that are then used by the women to produce actual
welfare, for the kids, for the adults, for anybody who needs care. There is no
Welfare State. This arrangement is called “familist” because care is produced
within the family. It is also “patriarchal”, because men earn all the money and
therefore have a greater power to decide how resources are allocated than the
other members. Within the family, there is bargaining, and there is exchange.
Money, earned by the men in paid work, is exchanged for time devoted by
women to unpaid work, by combining her time and market purchased goods.
Children and the frail elderly, who cannot provide for themselves, are the
recipients of care, as are the adult men who provide the household with the
money.
The arrangement is completely asymmetric: women perform all the
unpaid work, men all of the paid work. Only men earn money, and therefore
they may have more say on how it is spent. However, not much care is available
outside of the household. The situation is one of co-dependency; women are
very dependent for money resources on their family men and men are very
dependent for care provision on family women. Women and men are very
different social and economic actors; each specialises in one kind of work.
The arrangement has been changed dramatically by the introduction and
the expansion of public expenditure devoted to the satisfaction of care needs,
and by the parallel development of a “thick” market for personal services – by
“thick” meaning that a large amount of choices become available and affordable7
by most of the population. Part of the unpaid work once performed by women
within the household is now performed by women and men who are either
public or private employees. Women entered paid employment, in the public or
private sector.
The second graph represents a Welfare regime where reproduction and
care are produced by unpaid work of men and women, public services (provided
by men or women who are public employees), or bought on the market. Money
earned by family members of both sexes who are in paid employment is used to
purchase market services and “convenience” commodities.
7
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The graph shows how the arrangement for care provision changed dramatically
with the parallel developments of market provided personal services and the
expansion of public expenditure devoted to the satisfaction of care needs. In the
graph, the square shape “services” represents public or private services. The
Welfare State is represented by the hexagonal shape, can finance itself by
income taxes or by payroll taxes, and can deliver either cash or services. Part of
the unpaid work once performed by women within the household is now
performed by women and men who are either public or private employees. Care
is provided within the “public sphere”, where the relevant definition of public
includes the market, – an institution regulated by the law to which any citizen is
free to participate either as buyer or seller according to agreed norms – as
opposed to the “private sphere” of the family. Women enter paid employment,
in the public or “private” i.e. market as opposed to “public” sector. Their labour
force participation rates climb up to become almost equal to men’s in some
countries. They have some independent access to money through their own
earnings or through cash transfers. The economic exchange of money for care
that once happened only within the household now moved to the public sphere,
and the economic value of time spent in household production became more
evident .8
Nordic and Anglo-Saxon Welfare states are undoubtedly very different
from each other if we look at size, and even more if we look at the relative size
of market provided versus public service provided care, and in many other
respects. Yet they are very similar in one respect: they can both be represented
by graph two, just by altering the relative size of the two shapes that represent
the Welfare state, and the relative size of public versus private services
8.
When personal services, no matter whether public or marketed, are
available as an alternative to domestically produced care, the position of men
and women becomes more symmetric: they both perform paid work, they both
earn money, they both can purchase part of the care. The time of both has an
economic value, and so both may be required to perform some domestic
production. Both can choose not to perform unpaid care work directly.
Children and frail elderly still require money that they cannot earn, and
has to come either from the State or from adults of either sex. The inter-
generational arrangements may be very different depending on how this is done.
But the economic reasons for the internal exchange of money for care between
adult men and women weakens.
The road is open for a more diversified set of personal choices, by people
of either sex. Care can be shifted out of domestic production. The specific
productive skills of the housekeeper – how to clean well, how to cook well  go
the way the skill of spinning and embroidering went, and the core of the care
work – responsibility for the well being of somebody else can be more easily
requested and performed independently of the sex of the care-giver. The
“single” lifestyle, where a single person is capable of earning enough and
provide enough care for her-himself is the product of this new arrangement. The
data on the use of time show most clearly the difference. In symmetric countries
time spent in unpaid work by women decreases, and time spent in unpaid care
work by men increases, even though it never completely converges to women’s.
(Gershuny, 1995).
Care work does not disappear. First of all, (Campanelli, 2000), the
standards of care change; what is commonly understood as being properly fed,
clean and so on shifts with technological and social change. Second, there is a
managerial aspect of care that cannot totally be avoided, even by the more
advanced of the professional two-incomes family that cleans all the laundry out
of the house and buys prepared meals in gourmet shops every night. In the end,
somebody has to make sure, to take responsibility for the final outcome of the
caring process of those people, who cannot do it by themselves. The need to9
care and the need to be cared for are strong stuff, in that respect. Personal
relations are also exchanges of reciprocal care.
 How much care will remain within domestic production, and how much
will be allocated respectively to the market and to the State, depends on the
details of the institutional arrangements, mainly, a) the method of financing of
public provisions, (income taxes, payroll taxes levied on earnings, fee-for-
service) b)the method of disbursement (cash or in kind), and c) the entitlement
to the benefits.
a) The method of financing matters.
Mandatory contribution levied on earnings (payroll taxes) in particular, have
two important features. First, it acts as a tax on the use of labour, increasing
labour costs and reducing employment. Take two economies with the same
features, one of which finances public expenditure with general income taxation
the second with payroll taxes. In the second economy, the same amount of
money must be raised on a narrower base – workers only, rather than the
economy at large. Labour cost is made up of net wage in the pocket of the
worker, plus payroll taxes. So labour cost will be higher in the second country,
and therefore, in that country, only jobs with a higher productivity will be
undertaken. This means that fewer people, overall, will be employed, occupation
rates of the overall population will be lower, and fewer women will be attracted
into the labour force. It also means that low productivity jobs, [as private sector
care jobs are perceived to be], will nor be undertaken. So employment
opportunities will be fewer for all, and in particular for women.
Second, with pay-roll taxes, entitlement in the welfare regime often
belongs to the worker, rather than to the citizen. Therefore, usually, to the male
head of the household, whose wife and children are construed as “dependents”.
Whether or not distribution within the family is then fair, and whether care
needs of all the members are met, becomes a private family matter, which does
not concern the State. On one hand this regime foster family unity. Italian out-of
wedlock rates are extremely low in comparison with those prevailing in Anglo-
Saxon and Nordic countries. On the other hand, if the family is dysfunctional,
there is no safety whatsoever (Bimbi 1997). The weak members of
dysfunctional families – battered spouses, abused or neglected children – have
nowhere to go.10
b) The method of disbursement also matters:
If the transfers are cash, they may be used either to finance the woman in the
family to be full-time or part-time housekeeper, or purchase care outside of the
home, to substitute for domestically provided care. If it is in kind, this choice is
not open, but the care-giver will be public employees, with the benefits of that
status.
So, who will ultimately provide the care – clean the nose of the child and
clean the bedpan of the frail elder – most likely will still be a woman. If the
transfer is in kind, she will be either a housekeeper, entitled to the benefits
either directly or through her husband  or a “private” employee, subject to
whatever employment protection exist in her country for private employees, and
the prevailing wage rates, which may be high or low depending on the kind of
care, the labour market situation etc. If the transfers are in kind, i.e. a public
service is provided free of charge to the user, or at subsidised below cost rates,
then the person providing care will most likely still be a woman, a public
employee subject to employment protection and wages prevailing in the public
sector, where protection is usually higher, and wages have a more compact
distribution than in the private sector.
The condition of the caregiver and, therefore, her social status, is likely to
be more secure and better rewarded in the Nordic regimes, second in the Anglo-
Saxon, where they depend on the labour market conditions and may be affected
by discrimination, while in the continental regimes the amount of monetary
resources and the status of the care-giver depends on the functionality of her
family, and in practice, may be anywhere between very high and very low.
c)  Other institutional details matter
First of all, we have what economists call “traps”
9. Particular features both of
taxation and of disbursement designed having in mind the traditional
arrangement create peculiar “traps” which reproduce that same arrangement,
fostering women’s dependency. Tax allowances for those who have a non-
earning spouse create incentives for spouses to remain non-earning. Income
thresholds for access to benefits calculated in terms of joint earnings of the
family, which make the family lose the benefit when, with the additional income
of the second earner, they overcome the threshold also cause women to exit the
labour force. Many econometric studies in different countries documented the
presence of these effects, which Tindara Addabbo and Massimo Baldini (2000)
measured for Italy.11
Under the heading of “family policies”, different provisions transfer
resources for families with children. Relevant in evaluating these policies from a
gender point of view, is the concept of “vulnerability” to poverty, developed by
Ann Orloff(1996). The idea here is that people may enjoy a given level of
material well being using resources provided by the Welfare State, without
having direct entitlement to them. Thus, young unemployed people who live off
their parents high pension are not poor  they may be even quite rich if we look
at lifestyles and consumption standards yet they are vulnerable to poverty
should the parents decide to cut the funding. Family policies may be quite
effective in transferring resources to the family, yet they may still be quite
ineffective in making the care givers in the family non vulnerable to poverty, if
the entitlement of the benefit belongs to the male breadwinner.
Family policies under which the caregiver depends for cash on the male
breadwinner reconstruct that inner link of "care in exchange for money"
characteristic of the traditional arrangement. They lift the family as a whole out
of poverty, but do not make the caregiver feel safe an non-vulnerable to poverty.
This concept of vulnerability to poverty is extremely important in relation to
fertility.
Labour market policies also matters, as they influence the length of time
that is spent in paid work and how much money it is obtained by it. If the
standard labour contract calls for a weekly working time of nearly 40 hours, and
no part-time or other “friendly” flexibility is available, mothers may drop out
more easily from the labour force. If mandatory retirement is too early, they may
never re-enter
10. Even administrative arrangements about opening hours of
shops and offices matter: if they are strictly regulated they may make
conciliation of working life and family life impossible for men and women.
Thus, by a particular mix of institutional details, Continental and Latin
Welfare Regimes have tried to preserve and superimpose the traditional
arrangement of care provisions over the modern one. Using pay-roll taxes rather
than income taxation, cash disbursement rather than in kind provision, and other
policies riddled with traps, or provisions that eliminate poverty but leave
vulnerability to poverty fully in place, they create an incentive to an
arrangement that may be represented as in the third graph.12









The old, asymmetric structure is artificially preserved, including the exchange of
care for money internal to the family. There is an evident attempt to recreate the
specialisation – women in unpaid care work, men in paid workof the
traditional arrangement.
 The “structures of constraint” – as Nancy Folbre (1994) brilliantly defines
them–are very different in each of the three models of Welfare. Men and
women make daily choices – choices about how to spend their time and their
money. These choices are made under a complex set of constraints, created by
the available resources and by the alternatives that are effectively in place. The
constraints are the result, among other things, of the political choices made by
men and women on how large public spending should be and how it should be
allocated. And today they are very different in Sweden, in Italy, and in the USA.
In symmetric regimes, women and men are, to an extent, more free not to
provide care. If they have money enough and-or are willing to pay enough taxes,
they need not perform care directly and personally. In asymmetric regimes,
either the public provision is insufficient in amount and quality, or the market
for care is not thick enough, or both. Therefore, if you will not care personally
for your relatives, nobody will; and in such conditions, women do.
The symmetric/asymmetric distinction is most relevant from the gender
viewpoint. Gender is the set of physical and mental characteristics, and the proper,
normal, behaviour that each culture attributes to people on the basis of their
biological sex, and we know that it changes widely between cultures and times.
Gender, today, in industrialised advanced democracies, is the result of the political
choices about how much to tax , how much to spend, and the institutional details13
of how it is spent. There is very little that is “natural”, or “traditional” in how
much unpaid work women do, relatively to men. It is not only a matter of
individual choices: it is a matter of how constraints are set by public policy, and
how they operate, for men and women
11.
Though different symmetric regimes put different structures of constraint
on people, a symmetric regime puts the same set of constraints to men and
women, within which they are then “free to choose”. Only in symmetric regimes
men and women similarly located in so far as income age etc. get the same
opportunities. Symmetry in the welfare arrangements is a prerequisite of the
existence, in the society, of equal opportunities for men and women
12.
2. Person-specific care in welfare production.
 
While we can imagine an archetypal world in which all of the care is provided
by the family, it is very hard to envisage a world where all of the care is
provided either by the market or the State. Some of the care most likely will be
exchanged voluntarily between people sharing a home, by free choice of most
people. Human relations are made up also of reciprocal unpaid care, and care
that is freely given among people who have time and money tend to be of very
high quality. There is an element here that is under-researched, what I call the
need for “person-specificity”
13 of some of the care. For many people to receive
care by a specific person has an higher value than to receive the same care from
a public or private employee who is not that specific person. For some other
people, to care for a specific person is a pleasure, to provide the exact same care
to other people is a burden. Care can be given professionally by a public or
private employee, but tender, loving care is that which is given for free because
of an emotion called affection, or, love, that run reciprocally between some
people.
The wishes for “person-specific” services may be different for the care
giver and the cared recipient. Asymmetric regimes enforce a particular kind of
person-specific care, by the woman of the house towards everybody else. This in
some cases, may be a gentle or not so gentle coercion of the will both of the care
receiver and of the caregiver. In other cases it corresponds to what the care
receiver want, even if the requested caregiver, the woman of the house, does not.
In other cases still, it correspond to a reciprocal, person-specific need. The need
for a child to be attended by his/her own parents, and of the parents to attend
their own child, or of a frail elderly to be attended by his/her own children, and
for them to do so.
In the traditional model, the main provider of person-specific care was the
women of the house, who spent all of their working time, unpaid, in doing so,14
while the men specialised in paid work, and spent all of their working time
performing it. If both men and women spend all of their working time in doing
paid work, person-specific care shrinks and eventually disappears. Most, or all of
the care work is done by professionals, in an exact exchange of time for money.
The opportunity cost of person-specific care becomes too high for people to
indulge in it
14. Care is commodified. There is no more time to provide free of
charge, person-specific care.
 This fact is of some relevance from the gender point of view. To be the free
care provider was one of the characteristic attributions of the feminine. Being
properly female was being the unpaid caregiver of one’s family. If unpaid care
shrinks or disappears, one characteristic formerly considered feminine disappears.
The lives of men and women become more similar; both are as men’s lives used to
be. All of their working time is spent in paid employment, often in a competitive
working environment where the values and the skills that are rewarded are those
traditionally associated with the masculine. Gender roles converge, but they do not
converge to some average, in which both genders perform some unpaid and some
paid work, in equal proportions. They converge towards the old male gender
figure. Assimilation, understood as women fitting in with the male model, is a
process under way in other sectors the society as well –women soldiers,
policewomen, all welcome and positive advancement for women but it does
not so far seem to correspond with a parallel assimilation of men to female
models and values
15. Society, as a whole, becomes more “masculine”
16. The real
world evolves towards the one depicted in the old model of neoclassical economic
theory, a world and a model where there is only paid work and leisure. Unpaid and
yet productive domestic care work disappears.
Unpaid working time produces person-specific services, services that are of
higher quality because of the special emotional relationship existing between two
human beings, and build and maintain special relationships between human beings
(on this point see author, 1997). In this framework, the shifting up of the standards
of care, some of it still provided by unpaid women – may be interpreted as the
result of the need for person-specific care by the cared for, coupled with women’s
desire to still maintain an identity, somewhat different from men’s, and to create,
keep and restore personal relations.
Allowing for  person-specific care, if willingly chosen by cared and
caregiver, is, according to many, a positive characteristic of a Welfare
arrangement, because it satisfies a human need, and in addition produces care of
extremely high quality. Leaving some time available for person-specific unpaid
care, may well be a positive characteristic of a Welfare regime from a feminist
point of view. The traditional arrangement, bad as it is and was for women’s
independence, may be preferred not only by many men, but also by many women,15
over a symmetric arrangement where person-specificity and the availability of
time to care are squeezed too much. The existing Welfare regimes, in a gender
perspective, are either lacking symmetry, or lacking person-specificity.
3. Welfare regimes in comparison: is there a trade off between symmetry
and person specificity?
A little exercise in taxonomy may help us evaluate regimes and show us that
there is no necessary trade-off between the symmetry and person specificity. In
the end, a Welfare regime must be judged by its financial soundness, by the
various dimensions of equity, by how well caregivers fare, and by how well
people who receive care fare. How do the different prevailing modes of
providing care – market, family, public services  compare in terms of quality
of care?
Quality of care provided in rich and in poor households is likely to be very
different, as care is a combination of time, skills and goods, and the rich get better
goods. In addition, if they like person-specific care, the rich can always choose to
perform more unpaid work, and give up some income. The poor do not have this
choice. Their time must be spent in paid work to earn the money to purchase the
goods. Quality of care is very different in functional families and in dysfunctional
families. The quality of personal relationships matters. In well to do, loving
families, the quality of care provided may be extremely high. It may be very low
otherwise. In regimes that are asymmetric, family care that is of low quality is the
only available alternative. So care provided through unpaid work is of uneven
quality, touching the extremes of very high and very low. The condition of the
caregivers in the family depends on the symmetry of the regime. If the regime is
symmetric, they can opt out of care giving and buy the care outside the home or
resort to public services. If it is asymmetric, they are trapped.
Care that is given outside of the household is by definition not person-
specific, although one may choose one’s restaurant, one’s physician, or the
school for one’ children, and usually more so through the market than through
the State. The quality of care provided in Welfare regimes that act principally
through the market depends on the wealth of the purchaser. It is very high for
the rich, and very low for the poor, so it is also very uneven. The condition of
the caregivers who sell care through the market as employees of some care
providing firm depends on the conditions of the labour market. In tight labour
markets where they can obtain an higher wage it will be better than when there
is high unemployment. In highly regulated labour markets workers can enjoy
excellent work conditions, as long as the labour market does not split into
insiders versus outsiders. Then, the outsiders may end up in a position even
worse than the average condition in unregulated labour markets. The condition16
of the caregivers who act independently – as maids, at-home-nurses etc.– is
usually at the lowest end of the scale of desirable jobs, in terms of earnings and
job protection.
The quality of the care provided by public services usually does not
depend on the wealth of the cared for, it is uniform along the wealth dimension.
However this quality may be very good, average, or bad. Believers in the
positive effects of competition claim that lack of it, in the long run, would
undermine the quality of public services. Although there is certainly a grain of
truth in this claim, the quality of care in some of the Nordic countries and in
some parts of the Continental regime is such that one may believe that, with
proper administrative policies and political pressure at the local level, an
excellent quality of care may be achieved. On the other end, it is undeniable that
parts of public systems at times provide substandard care and facilities – queues,
crumbling buildings, rigidities to the user – that do not appear in markets.
Whether for lack of appropriate culture or for lack of appropriate
administrative procedures, one of the distinguishing features of the Latin version
of the Continental model is what Ferrera (1998 and Ferrera e Gualmini 1999)
labelled lack of “statualità” (statuality). What is lacking is a consciousness that
public services belongs to all and should be performed according to the wishes
of the cared for. Lack of statuality makes public employees slack in doing their
duty, and lowers the quality of the care users get. Thus, Latin regimes in a time
of financial crisis have a built in tendency to move away from public services
and towards family or market care, in the search for quality care. If the quality
of public services is uniform for rich and poor at the about the same standards
that the market can provide for the rich, all is fine. If the quality of care in public
services deteriorates for all, then letting the rich have better care becomes Pareto
optimal, demand for family or market provided care grows, and the welfare
regime moves away from the Nordic and towards one of the other models. The
very high quality of some of the home provided care becomes an element of
resistance to the introduction of a prevailing public or market oriented regime.
Although the quality of services from the user point of view may be of
variable quality, the condition of caregivers who are public employees is usually
good in terms of salary, job protection, and working conditions. Excess
protection of the caregivers in some situations may interfere negatively with the
quality of care. Therefore, providing care by public services creates the need of
an efficient regime of checks and balances between the status of the caregiver
and the quality of care. The lack of statuality is not only the characteristic of
individual behavior: it translates into lack of appropriate institutions and
organization of the public administration.17
What discussed until now can be used to build a grid of parameters that
characterise different models of the Welfare State. Though keeping in mind that
such a grid cannot contain many nuances of a complex reality , I believe it is
useful to evaluate the performance of different Welfare Regimes and to focus on
needed changes.
The table below, representing such grid, classifies the three models of
Welfare, plus the Latin variation. Consider initially only the first four columns of
table A. They represent the existing models of Welfare. The first three rows
(Financing, Disbursement, Where and who cares) are purely descriptive. The rows
from the fourth on are my evaluation of these regimes along a series of relevant
parameters. The condition of the caregivers is evaluated according to the
prevailing mode in each regime, according to the level of autonomy, earnings, and
job protection. Where the family prevails as a mode of giving care, and caregivers
are the women in the family, their autonomy is low, earnings uneven, high for
wives of rich husbands and low for the wives of the poor, on the job protection is
regulated by customs and marriage laws. Earnings, autonomy and on the job
protection of the caregivers are best in Nordic regimes. Quality of non-domestic
care depends on wealth in market regimes, and is high both in the Nordic and
continental regimes. The difference between the continental and the Latin models
best emerges in the quality of non-domestic care. The “lack of statuality”
characteristic of the Latin models implies that the quality of public services tends
to be uniformly bad for the rich and the poor, rather than uniformly good, while
the market regime remains underdeveloped.18
Table 1. Taxonomy and evaluation of Welfare regimes.
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1M stands for market, S for State. F for family
2 M for Male F for female19
Nordic and Anglo-Saxon regimes score high in symmetry, while continental
and Latin regimes give incentive to asymmetry. The latter two, however, score
high on person-specificity, whilst, especially in liberal, Anglo-Saxon regimes
people of both sexes spend a very large amount of time in paid employment,
making person-specific care expensive and hard to get, especially for the poor
17 .
Anglo-Saxon and continental regimes leave more people vulnerable to poverty,
although for different reasons: the Anglo-Saxon regime because it is stingy in
benefits and fearful of poverty traps, the continental and Latin regimes because the
security net is for families: women and young people are left vulnerable.
 Freedom not to provide care is high in symmetric regimes, and low in the
others, except for the very rich. Freedom to care is high in Continental and Latin
regimes, but only for people to choose to devote their entire working time to
unpaid care, or retire early, but it is very low for women who choose to enter paid
employment, and have to carry the “double burden”, so it is unevenly distributed
between people of different sex, age and gender.
The exercise conducted in this table may be useful because it allows us to
focus on what the characteristics would be of a Welfare regime equitable from the
gender point of view. Such regime should be respectful, at the same time, of
women’s equal rights and of women’s “difference”, i.e. of those value that in the
traditional gender division of attributes, were associated to the feminine. It should,
therefore, be at the same time symmetric and allowing person-specificity.  The
characteristics of such regime would be, roughly speaking, those described by
column 5.
Even though existing welfare regimes are either too asymmetric or too
lacking person-specificity, there is no reason for it should be so. There is no
necessary trade-off between person-specificity and symmetry. Imagine a Welfare
regime suitably large, based on income taxation, rather than pay-roll taxes, and
redistributing through a proper mix of cash and in kind, with market and public
services in a competitive framework. It should moreover avoid the perverse
incentives that induce asymmetry, with connected disadvantages for women of
lack of autonomy, vulnerability to poverty etc. Such model of Welfare does not
need to have any internal unbalance
18. Existing Welfare regimes offer to women
either assimilation to the male model, or continuing civil inferiority, but this is not
a necessary evil. It is possible to design a Welfare regime openly keeping in mind
the necessity of person-specificity, that gives incentive to time spent in giving care
by people of both sexes. This regime, however, must be symmetric, otherwise the
attempt to induce person-specificity will reinforce the traditional pattern with
related problems.20
Even though such a regime is not a utopia, in the sense that it is a coherent
structure and its elements fit together in such a way that such a system could
function, its political feasibility, nowadays, is not very high. For many reasons
beyond the scope of this paper, the political climate is working strongly against
it
19. One of such reasons, in my opinion, is the lack of clarity on these issues, even
among actors whose interests are at stake, with the consequent inability to frame
them properly in the political arena. In many countries, as in Italy in the last five
years, women continue to be willing to give up symmetry in exchange for person
specificity, and in other countries they give up person specificity for symmetry and
autonomy. The left remains stuck in defending an asymmetric welfare as it is, thus
loosing the ability to speak of novelty and improvement, according to old equity
values, to key sectors of the electorate. To such clarification I hope to have
contributed with this paper.
Elisabetta Addis
Universita "La Sapienza", Roma
email elisabetta.addis@uniroma1.it21
NOTES
1 I use "gender" to indicate the set of physical and mental characteristics, and the proper, normal,
behavior that each culture attributes to people on the basis of their biological sex. Gender,
therefore, changes widely in time and space, through history and in different cultures and
civilizations. For a thorough discussion of the concept of "gender" see Nelson (1996).
2On age redistribution in Italy, see the very influential work by Rossi, (1997). There are, of
course, many other dimensions of redistribution, between the healthy and the sick, between
the lucky and the unlucky, between regions, or ethnic groups, etc. that may need to be
considered in a full evaluation of the performance of a Welfare. For a classical discussion of
the various dimensions of equity and of gender equity see Sen (1990 and 1992)).
3 On the economic evaluation of unpaid working time see Bonke, 1993, Goldschmidt-
Clermont Luisella and Pagnossin-Aligisakis, Eleni (1995).
4Among the main contributions to this literature see Borchorst, (1994), Brocas, Cailloux and
Oget, (1990), De Leonardis, (1998), Fraser, (1997),Gordon and Fraser, (1994), Gustavsson
and Stafford (1994), Hobson, (1990), Jenson, (1986), Knijn and Ungerson, (1997), Lewis,
(1992), O’Connor (1993), O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver, (1999), Ostner and Lewis, (1995),
Sainsbury, (1993 and 1996), Saraceno (1994 and 1997) Trifiletti, Rossana (1996) Ungerson,
(1997).
5 In order to classify models, the kind of industrial relation system is also relevant, with
centralised or decentralised wage setting, and with cooperation or conflict as the prevailing
wage setting mode. We choose not to deal with these differences because they are not relevant
to our theme.
6 By market provided care I mean the purchase of a service that was formerly available within
the household: child care, a warm meal, laundry. Purchasing the time of a domestic worker is
a short-cut by which home produced services are purchased in the market.
7 Commodities that incorporate saved time, like shelled beans or frozen meals.
8 It is this similarity that produces roughly similar high female participation rates to the labour
force in Nordic and Liberal regimes. Continental and latin regimes as a group lag well behind.
9 Traps are perverse incentives due to the “moral hazard” that may be created by of insurance
schemes. An often used example is that of a person who has unemployment insurance, and
therefore will not look for a job as long as the insurance payment lasts.
10 On these issues, see also Gornick, Mayer and Ross,(1997).
11 Which implies that analyses based on rational choice theories, albeit useful, have clear
limitations for comparative and evaluation purposes, as they take the structures of constraints
as given.
12 In formerly published work (Author 1999) I described with more institutional detail how
the Italian Welfare works with respect to gender. The general framework of Italian Welfare
penalises women’s paid work, and gives recognition to women’s unpaid work only if it is an
exclusive choice made as a “dependent” of a man. Benefits are linked to the job
12, but only
the job of one earner. I analysed how family policies, pension policies, unemployment
policies, and newly introduced means testing worked together in depressing female activity
rates, giving incentive to dependent housekeeping as a lifelong choice, shifting care towards
the family, forcing traditional roles on an otherwise “mature” society.22
13 An item is called “personalised” when it is built to custom, unique, and fit specifically one’
person need, though it does not matter who build it. With person-specificity I tried to find a
word indicating the opposite concept. A service, roughly similar in its material content, has a
different value according to who performs it, not because it is done better according to some
standard, or because or the skills of the performer. For a child is not the same to be fed by a
parent or by a teacher; for a frail elderly is not the same to be cleaned by a nurse or by a her
own child.
14 The issue of commodification of care was analyzed in detail by Ungerson (1997).
15 See Gershuny, (1995).
16 A "neutral but male" society emerges , competitive, hierarchical, aggressive and rigid -
turning away from the values that women have historically been the depositaries of. Solidarity,
meekness, mediation and caring abilities loose value and become ever rarer in both men and
women.
17 The tendency towards long working schedules, documented by Schor,(1991) has been
reinforced by the workfare provisions of the Welfare reform at the end of the nineties.
18Whether it is competitive with other national systems depends on how you measure the
economic benefits of enjoying time to care.
19On the political setting of recent European Welfare reforms, see also Addis (2000).23
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